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The period of the Cold War, with its associated East-West divisions and ever-present
threat of nuclear war, presented considerable obstacles to the flowering of the methods of
international dispute resolution that were envisaged in Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter.
Those approaches to dispute resolution might be grouped into three categories: resolution of
disputes by applying rules of international law, such as resort to arbitration or international
courts; resolution of disputes through the projection of power, either in self-defence or under
authorisation of the Security Council; and resolution of disputes by identifying and
accommodating the interests of the disputing states (or other actors), such as through negotiation,
mediation or conciliation, sometimes under the auspices of the United Nations or regional
organisations.
After the Cold War, hopes arose that such approaches to dispute resolution would
accelerate, and to a certain degree they did. While some of these developments occurred in direct
response to the end of the Cold War, they were by no means exclusive to Cold War-era claims.
New international courts and tribunals emerged alongside the International Court of Justice, and
there was a significant increase in resort to arbitration, notably in the area of investor-state
arbitration. Such matters are addressed in Chapter 26 of this volume. The Security Council made
strides toward its envisaged role of projecting power, as demonstrated during Iraq’s invasion of
Kuwait in 1990-1, and has remained active thereafter in addressing threats to peace and security,
as discussed in Chapters 10 and 14 of this volume.
Alongside these advances in binding dispute resolution, states have also continued to rely
on and expand flexible, consent-based approaches for the resolution of disputes through
techniques for identifying and accommodating the interests of the disputing states. The demise of
the East-West divide opened up greater opportunities for negotiated settlements in areas such as
trade in goods and services; protection of intellectual property; prevention of transboundary
environmental harm; and delimitation of land and maritime boundaries. Dispute resolution
through mediation or conciliation also advanced, albeit to a greater or lesser degree, just as they
had within national legal systems.2 Through initiatives such as the 1992 An Agenda for Peace,
the United Nations sought to play a greater role in framing the means for dispute resolution and
its own role in that regard, while regional and even sub-regional organisations sought to carve
out a path for resolving disputes in their domain. Across these mechanisms, non-state actors such
as corporations and individuals also began to participate more directly in international dispute
resolution processes. Such efforts are the focus of this chapter.
1

Chapter 25 from The Cambridge History of International Law, Volume XII (International Law Beyond the End of the Cold
War).
2 For alternative dispute resolution within national legal systems, see Carlos Esplugues & Silvia Barona, eds., Global
Perspectives on ADR (Cambridge/Antwerp/Portland: Intersentia 2014).
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I.

Meaning of ‘dispute’

A threshold question that arises with respect to dispute resolution is whether, in fact, a
‘dispute’ exists. Two parties to a dispute may agree on this issue but, if they do not, establishing
that a dispute exists may prove important in relation to obligations that the parties have to
negotiate, mediate or conciliate such a dispute, as well as to other forms of dispute settlement.3
Since the end of the Cold War, and with the emergence of numerous venues for dispute
resolution, the question of whether a ‘dispute’ exists often has been litigated, allowing for the
development of greater clarity than existed with earlier jurisprudence. To take just decisions
rendered by the International Court of Justice, it is not sufficient simply to note that one party
maintains that a dispute has arisen under a treaty, while the other denies it.4 Indeed, according to
the Court, “…the existence of a dispute is a matter of substance, and not a question of form or
procedure.”5 Rather, one must ascertain whether the substantive acts or omissions complained of
by the first party are capable of falling within the provisions of the treaty or other source of law
at issue.
In establishing the existence of a dispute, prior negotiations or formal diplomatic protest
are not necessarily required;6 indeed, one may solely take account of statements or documents
exchanged between the parties.7 But, critically, the parties must ‘“hold clearly opposite views
concerning the question of the performance or non-performance of certain” international
obligations’.8 For example, simply expressing opposition to the other party’s view at an
international conference, or casting votes different from that other party, was found not to be a
sufficient basis for establishing dispute when the Marshall Islands in 2014 pursued claims
against certain nuclear powers.9 At the same time, ‘the existence of a dispute may be inferred
from the failure of a State to respond to a claim in circumstances where a response is called
for’.10 Where two parties are in agreement but wish a tribunal to ‘bless’ their agreement, that is
not a ‘dispute’ and thus may not be within the tribunal’s jurisdiction.11
II.
3

Enhanced emphasis on dispute settlement through the United Nations

Yoshifumi Tanaka, The Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2018) 8-19.
Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab
Emirates) (Provisional Measures) (2018) ICJ Rep 406, 414, para. 18.
5 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian
Federation) (Preliminary Objections) (2011) ICJ Rep 70, 84, para. 30.
6 Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria) (Preliminary Objections)
(1998) ICJ Rep 275, 321-2, para. 109 (negotiations not required); Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in
the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Colombia) (Preliminary Objections) (2016) ICJ Rep 3, 32, para. 72 (diplomatic protest not
required).
7 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (The Gambia v. Myanmar)
(Provisional Measures) 2020 ICJ Rep 3, 12, para. 26; Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v.
Senegal) (Merits) (2012) ICJ Rep 422, 443-5, paras. 50-5.
8 Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Colombia) (Preliminary
Objections) (2016) ICJ Rep 3, 26, para. 50 (citing Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, First
Phase, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1950, p. 74).
9 See, e.g., Obligations concerning Negotiations relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament
(Marshall Islands v. India) (Jurisdiction and Admissibility) (2016) ICJ Rep 255 (parallel cases were brought against Pakistan and
the United Kingdom).
10 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian
Federation) (Preliminary Objections) (2011) ICJ Rep 70, 84, para. 30.
11 Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v. Niger) (Judgment) (2013) ICJ Rep 44, 71, para. 53.
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When international disputes arise, the UN Charter envisages that the United Nations will
play an important role in resolving them. That role intensified after the Cold War ended and the
divisions within the UN Security Council and General Assembly – to a degree – eased.12 Various
strands of emphasis may be discerned from UN practice, especially in the years immediately
following the end of the Cold War.
First, central to UN practice in this time period was a reaffirmation of the basic obligation
of states to settle disputes by peaceful means. In December 1992, as armed conflict erupted in the
Balkans, the General Assembly encouraged member states (as well as other actors) to play a
more active and conscious role in the settlement of disputes through peaceful means.13 Such
statements were repeatedly made in UN instruments thereafter, such as in the 2005 ‘World
Summit Outcome’ document, where the General Assembly included a section on ‘pacific
settlement of disputes’14 and ‘emphasize[d] the obligation of States to settle their disputes by
peaceful means’.15
Yet this obligation of states to settle disputes peacefully was developed even further, to a
degree, so as to encompass an obligation to cooperate within the UN system to help resolve the
disputes of others. Indeed, repeated references in UN practice may be found to the responsibility
of member states to develop a ‘cultural consensus’ that the United Nations is the appropriate
forum to settle disputes, and to share relevant information with the appropriate UN institutions
toward dispute resolution.16 For example, in 1997 the General Assembly noted the important role
that member states play in supporting UN international peace and security efforts, with states
providing assistance to the Secretary-General individually or in informal groups.17 Among other
things, such views spawned the use of informal groups dubbed as ‘friends of the SecretaryGeneral’, consisting of certain member states who, on an ad hoc basis and without any formal
mandate, band together due to a particular interest in resolving a dispute or conflict, so as to
deploy material and diplomatic resources that support the Secretary-General’s efforts.18 More
formally, such views led to the creation in 2005 of the UN Peacebuilding Commission, an
intergovernmental advisory body of 31 Member States (elected from the General Assembly, the
12

UN Charter, art. 1(1) (purposes of the United Nations includes settlement of international disputes); art. 2(3) (Members shall
settle international disputes peacefully); chap. VI (pacific settlement of disputes); art. 34-8 (Security Council role); art. 35
(disputes may be brought to General Assembly or Security Council); art. 52 (settlement of disputes through regional
arrangements); art. 98 (Secretary-General performs functions entrusted to him/her by the General Assembly or Security Council);
art. 99 (Secretary-General may bring matters threatening peace to Security Council’s attention). See generally UN Office of
Legal Affairs, Handbook on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes between States (New York: United Nations 1992); D.N.
Hutchinson, ‘The Material Scope of the Obligation Under the United Nations Charter to Take Actions to Settle International
Disputes’, Australian Year Book of International Law (1993), 1; Tanaka, The Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes, 73104.
13 UNGA Res 47/120, at 3 (18 December 1992); see T.M. Franck, ‘The Secretary-General’s Role in Conflict Resolution: Past,
Present and Pure Conjecture,’ European Journal of International Law, 6 (1995) 360-87.
14 UNGA Res 60/1, 2005 World Outcome (16 September 2005).
15 Ibid. para. 73.
16 See UNGA Res 43/51 paras. 1, 5 (5 December 1988); Supplement to the Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the SecretaryGeneral on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, para. 28 (25 January 1995), UN Doc A/50/60; UNGA
Res 47/120, 3 (18 December 1992); UNGA Res 51/242, Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, annex I, para. 1 (15 September
1997).
17 UNGA Res 51/242, annex I, paras. 1, 4 (15 September 1997).
18 See, e.g., Secretariat, Mechanisms established by the General Assembly in the context of dispute prevention and settlement,
para. 27 (14 April 2000) UN Doc A/AC.182/2000/INF/2.
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Security Council and the Economic and Social Council) that supports peace efforts in conflictaffected countries.19
Moreover, the obligation of states to settle disputes peacefully was seen as entailing an
acceptance of UN assistance, when appropriate. Indeed, recognizing that it is often a prerequisite
for a member state to provide consent before the United Nations can act to prevent or resolve a
dispute, the Secretary-General determined that Member States may need to ‘creat[e] a climate of
opinion, or ethos, within the international community in which the norm would be for Member
States to accept an offer of United Nations good offices’.20
Second, the United Nations in this time period placed an increased emphasis on the need
to prevent disputes that might lead to armed conflict. The Secretary-General’s 1992 An Agenda
for Peace not only noted the unique opportunity for the United Nations to be a forum for dispute
resolution in a post-Cold War world,21 but paid particular attention to the concept of preventive
diplomacy,22 defined as ‘action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent
existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they
occur’.23 Other UN organs applauded this emphasis. The President of the Security Council, for
example, noted that in order to operationalize the Agenda’s recommendations it was necessary
‘to strengthen the United Nations potential for preventive diplomacy’, while highlighting ‘with
satisfaction the increased use of fact-finding missions’.24 A decade later, the General Assembly
adopted a resolution on the ‘Prevention and peaceful settlement of disputes’, in which it
‘[e]mphasiz[ed] the importance of early warning to prevent disputes, and … the need to promote
the peaceful settlement of disputes’.25 Among other things, the General Assembly ‘[u]rge[d]
States to make the most effective use of existing procedures and methods for the prevention and
peaceful settlement of their disputes’26 and ‘to settle their disputes as early as possible’.27
Likewise, the General Assembly in its 2005 World Summit Outcome document ‘stress[ed] the
importance of prevention of armed conflict in accordance with the purposes and principles of the
Charter’,28 a point that both the General Assembly and the Security Council continued to make
throughout this period.29
Third, a particular emphasis in this period was placed on the need to enhance the role of
the Secretary-General (and concomitantly the UN Secretariat) with respect to dispute settlement.
In January 1992, the UN Security Council met for the first time at the level of heads of state and
19

See UNGA Res 60/180 (20 December 2005); UNSC Res 1645 (20 December 2005) (establishing the Commission). For
subsequent resolutions expanding and refining its mandate, see UNGA Res 70/262 (2016); UNSC Res 2282 (2016); UNGA Res
75/201 (2020); UNSC Res 2558 (2020).
20 Supplement to the Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of
the United Nations, para. 28 (25 January 1995), UN Doc A/50/60.
21 UN Secretary-General, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping, para. 15, (17 June
1992) UN Doc A/47/277-S-/2411.
22 Ibid. para. 5. The Agenda also addressed peacemaking, peace-keeping and post-conflict peacebuilding.
23 Ibid. para. 20.
24 UNSC Pres Note, UN Doc S/25859 (28 May 1993), 3.
25 UNGA Res 57/26, pmbl. (19 November 2002).
26 Ibid. para. 1.
27 Ibid. para. 2.
28 UNGA Res 60/1, 2005 World Outcome ¶ 74 (16 September 2005).
29 See, e.g., UNGA Res 70/262 (27 April 2016); UNSC Res 2282 (27 April 2016) (concurrent resolutions adopted reviewing the
UN peacebuilding architecture).
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government and, among other things, invited the Secretary-General to report on how the United
Nations could strengthen and make more efficient under the UN Charter its capacity for
preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping.30 Shortly thereafter, in February 1992,
Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali announced a major restructuring of the United
Nations, designed to enhance its capacity in these areas. Among this restructuring was the
establishment of a Department of Political Affairs (DPA),31 which was ‘expected to assist in the
gathering and analysis of information, in alerting the relevant organs about impending crises or
emergencies, and in carrying out mandates decided upon by the Security Council, the General
Assembly and other competent organs’.32 A few months later, An Agenda for Peace (noted
above) observed that the Secretary-General can pursue preventive diplomacy ‘personally or
through senior staff or specialized agencies and programmes, by the Security Council or the
General Assembly, and by regional organizations in cooperation with the United Nations’.33 The
Security Council seconded these efforts, when its President in 1993 urged that member states
provide the Secretary-General with information on potential conflicts and that ‘the SecretaryGeneral … consider appropriate measures for strengthening the Secretariat capacity to collect
and analyse information’.34
In January 1995, the Secretary-General issued a supplementary report to An Agenda for
Peace so as ‘to highlight selectively certain areas where unforeseen, or only partly foreseen,
difficulties have arisen’.35 In order to remedy the lack of senior personnel to serve as special
representatives or envoys, and the need for more permanent small-scale field missions, the
Secretary-General proposed including in the UN budget a multi-million-dollar contingency
provision for such activities, and ‘to make it available for all preventive and peacemaking
activities, not just those related to international peace and security strictly defined’.36 Thereafter,
the General Assembly approved such budgetary expenditures, allowing the Secretariat to
significantly increase its activities relating to dispute settlement.37 After an extended period of
growth in this area, the DPA was combined in 2019 with the UN Peacebuilding Support Unit so
as to form the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA). At present, the DPPA
is the principal support structure for various aspects of UN dispute resolution, including by
means of UN special representatives, special envoys, special political missions, regional offices,
resident coordinators (in countries where there is no UN mission) and related positions, all acting
on behalf of the Secretary-General.

30

Note by the President of the Security Council, UN Doc S/23500, 3-4 (31 January 1992), UN Yearbook 1992, 33.
This department incorporated the activities of the several previous departments and offices: Office for Political and General
Assembly Affairs and Secretariat Services; Office for Research and the Collection of Information; Department of Political and
Security Council Affairs; Department for Special Political Questions, Regional Cooperation, Decolonization and Trusteeship;
and the Department for Disarmament Affairs.
32 Restructuring of the Secretariat of the Organization: Note by the Secretary-General, UN Doc A/46/882, paras. 5-6 (21 February
1992). The restructuring also involved the establishment of a Department of Peace-keeping Operations, as well as the
consolidation of other departments and offices.
33 UN Secretary-General, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping, ¶ 23, UN Doc
A/47/277-S-/2411 (17 June 1992).
34 UNSC Pres Note, 3, UN Doc S/25859 (28 May 1993).
35 Supplement to the Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of
the United Nations, ¶ 6 (25 January 1995), UN Doc A/50/60.
36 Ibid. paras. 29-32.
37 See, e.g., Secretariat, Mechanisms established by the General Assembly in the context of dispute prevention and settlement, ¶¶
25–26 (14 Apr. 2000) UN Doc. No. A/AC.182/2000/INF/2.
31
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Fourth, despite the emphasis on the role of the Secretary-General, in this period there was
also a repeated recognition of the need for coherent and integrated approach by all UN organs for
prevention and settlement of disputes. Indeed, in numerous resolutions, the General Assembly
stressed that different UN organs can play complementary roles in preventing the emergence of
disputes and ameliorating those that have emerged, relying on their respective institutional
strengths.38 For example, the 2002 resolution on ‘Prevention and peaceful settlement of disputes’
highlighted the respective roles that the Secretary-General, Security Council and General
Assembly can play in identifying early warning signs that a dispute might emerge and to attempt
to prevent disputes that do emerge.39
With respect to peacemaking, the Secretary-General in the Agenda for Peace recognized
he alone may not be able ‘to bring hostile parties to agreement by peaceful means’.40
Consequently, the Secretary-General ‘urge[d] the [Security] Council to take full advantage of the
provisions of the Charter under which it may recommend appropriate procedures or methods for
dispute settlement and, if all the parties to a dispute so request, make recommendations to the
parties for a pacific settlement of the dispute’.41 No doubt with this in mind, the General
Assembly in the 2005 World Summit Outcome document ‘further stress[ed] the importance of a
coherent and integrated approach to the prevention of armed conflicts and the settlement of
disputes and the need for’ better coordination across the activities of different UN organs ‘within
their respective Charter mandates’.42
Finally, although the United Nations saw itself as central in the prevention and settlement
of international disputes in this period, it often acknowledged the important supporting roles that
regional organizations must play in settling disputes.43 For example, the annex to the 1997
General Assembly Resolution on the Supplement to An Agenda for Peace noted the need to
coordinate with regional organizations (and non-governmental organisations) to ensure peace
and security.44
III.

Negotiated settlement of disputes

In resolving an international dispute, two states need not engage a third party, such as the
United Nations, to assist them. Indeed, the most common means for resolving disputes, which
has continued in the post-Cold War period, is through bilateral or multilateral negotiations by the
states concerned.45 Having said that, the involvement of third parties through processes such as
38

See, e.g., UNGA Res 43/51 (5 December 1988); UNGA Res 47/120, 3 (18 December 1992); UNGA Res 51/242, Supplement
to an Agenda for Peace, paras. 11-15 (15 September 1997) annex I; UNGA Res 60/1, 2005 World Outcome, para. 76 (16
September 2005).
39 UNGA Res 57/26, para. 3 (19 November 2002).
40 UN Secretary-General, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping, ¶ 34, UN Doc
A/47/277-S-/2411 (17 June 1992).
41 Ibid. para. 35.
42 UNGA Res 60/1, 2005 World Outcome, para. 75 (16 September 2005).
43 See UN Secretary-General, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping, para. 23, UN Doc
A/47/277-S-/2411 (17 June 1992); UNGA Res 51/242, Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, annex I, paras. 11-14 (15 September
1997).
44 UNGA Res. 51/242, annex I, paras. 11-15 (15 September 1997).
45 See generally Kari Hakapää, ‘Negotiation’, in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (2013),
www.opil.ouplaw.com (subscription database); Alberto L. Davérède, ‘Negotiations, Secret’, in Max Planck Encyclopedia of
Public International Law (2013), www.opil.ouplaw.com (subscription database); Victor A. Kremenyuk (ed.), International
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mediation or conciliation may be seen as a more elaborate form of negotiation, in that ultimately
the states concerned must negotiate their way toward an outcome, if the dispute is to be resolved
successfully. Even in the context of litigation, the dispute settler might encourage the disputing
states to pursue a negotiated settlement,46 no doubt recognising that such a settlement may be a
more enduring method for pacific settlement of the dispute.
Most major multilateral treaties concluded since the end of the Cold War have contained
provisions essentially inviting or requiring the parties to a dispute to pursue, in the first instance,
negotiations47 (or ‘consultations’48 or an ‘exchange of views’),49 albeit without requiring a
specific outcome. Similarly, recent bilateral agreements may require the pursuit of negotiations
to resolve a dispute.50 The extent to which such provisions have helped resolve disputes without
having to proceed to more elaborate forms of dispute resolution cannot be readily observed, but
it would seem likely that states are motivated for reasons of political expediency and economic
efficiency to resolve disputes quietly and quickly when possible. Moreover, for more advanced
methods of dispute settlement, it may be necessary to demonstrate an attempt at negotiation or at
least that a dispute has not or cannot be ‘settled by negotiation’.51
In the post-Cold War period, the central role of the United Nations in providing
opportunities for negotiation has been stressed.52 In 1998, the General Assembly adopted a
resolution on Principles and Guidelines for International Negotiations, which reaffirmed earlier
principles of sovereign equality, non-intervention, and good faith fulfilment of international
Negotiation: Analysis, Approaches, Issues (2nd edn., San Francisco: Wiley 2002); Alain Plantey, International Negotiation in the
Twenty-First Century (trans. Frances Meadows) (New York: Routledge-Cavendish 2007); Evangelos Raftopoulos, International
Negotiation: A Process of Relational Governance for International Common Interest (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
2019); Valerie Rosoux & Mark Anstey (eds.), Negotiating Reconciliation in Peacemaking: Quandaries of Relationship Building
(Springer 2017); Brigid Starkey, Mark A. Boyer & Jonathan Wilkenfeld, International Negotiation in a Complex World (4th edn.,
Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield 2016); I. William Zartman & Jeffrey Z. Rubin (eds.), Power and Negotiation (Ann
Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press 2000); Tanaka, The Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes, 29-42.
46 See, e.g., Passage through the Great Belt (Finland v Denmark) (Provisional Measures) (1991) ICJ Rep 12, para. 35 (Court’s
statement that, ‘pending a decision of the Court on the merits, any negotiation between the Parties with a view to achieving a
direct and friendly settlement is to be welcomed’; thereafter, a settlement in fact was reached between the parties).
47 See, e.g., UN Convention against Corruption, 31 October 2003, 2349 UNTS 41, art. 66(1) (‘States Parties shall endeavour to
settle disputes concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention through negotiation.’); UN Convention on
Jurisdictional Immunities of States, 2 December 2004, UN Doc A/59/38, annex, art. 27(1) (same); International Convention for
the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, 23 December 2010, 2716 UNTS 3, art. 42(1) (providing that any
‘Any dispute between two or more States Parties concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention which cannot be
settled through negotiation’ may be taken to arbitration, and then to the ICJ).
48 See, e.g., Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes arts. 4(3) & 4(7), Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, annex 2, 15 April 1994, 1869 UNTS 401, 404 (obligating members who
have a dispute to enter into consultations in good faith, to commence within 30 days of a member’s request and concluded within
60 days of request).
49 See, e.g., UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 397, art. 283(1) (‘When a dispute arises…the
parties to the dispute shall proceed expeditiously to an exchange of views regarding its settlement by negotiation or other
peaceful means.’).
50 For example, Romania and Ukraine agreed, in the context of their Treaty on Good Neighbourliness and Co-operation, to
‘negotiate an Agreement on the delimitation of the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zones in the Black Sea’. See
Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine) (Judgment) (2009) ICJ Rep 61, 70, para. 18.
51 See, e.g., Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic of the Congo v.
Rwanda) (Jurisdiction and Admissibility) (2006) ICJ Rep 6, para. 91 (rejecting jurisdiction, inter alia, because ‘[t]he evidence has
not satisfied the Court that the DRC in fact sought to commence negotiations in respect of the interpretation or application of the
Convention’ on Discrimination against Women).
52 See, e.g., In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All, Report of the Secretary-General,
(2005) UN Doc. A/59/2005.
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obligations, but also identified further principles, such as that negotiations must be conducted in
good faith, the purpose and object of negotiations must be fully compatible with the UN Charter,
and states must refrain from any conduct that might undermine negotiations.53 Moreover,
increased attention has been placed on the role of actors other than just states and international
organisations, at least for certain types of negotiations. For example, the High-level Panel on
Threats, Challenges and Change urged the United Nations to have ‘[g]reater consultation with
and involvement in peace processes of important voices from civil society, especially those of
women, who are often neglected during negotiations’.54
While many international disputes in the post-Cold War era have not been resolved
through negotiation, there are many negotiated settlements, though not always of enduring
success. Among the most prominent are the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA),
by which several states and the European Union agreed with Iran on resolving a dispute relating
to the latter’s nuclear program,55 or the 2020 agreements known collectively as the Abraham
Accords, by which two Arab states normalised diplomatic relations with Israel after many
decades of tension.56 Yet for any given subject area of international law in the post-Cold War
era, numerous negotiations of disputes, large and small, may be observed. For example, with
respect to disputes over maritime boundaries, by one account there were more than sixty
negotiations between states from 1994 to 2012; some of those negotiations succeeded, some did
not, and others remain ongoing.57
IV.

Mediation, good offices and inquiry for dispute resolution

Mediation is commonly understood as a means whereby a third party assists the disputing
parties, with their consent, in resolving the dispute, such as through proposing solutions for the
parties’ consideration. The process is often confidential and is more informal that conciliation,
arbitration or judicial dispute settlement.58 By some estimates, three-quarters of peace
negotiations are with the assistance of one or more mediators, perhaps a reflection of the
difficulties faced when two belligerents seek to end an armed conflict.59
The 1992 Agenda for Peace drawn up by the UN Secretary-General noted that
procedures like ‘[m]ediation and negotiation can be undertaken by an individual designated by
53

UNGA Res 53/101 (8 December1998).
UN Doc. A/59/565, para. 103 (2004).
55 See Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (14 July 2015), https://perma.cc/U7WT-9VQ7. For commentary, see Steven Hurst,
‘The Iranian Nuclear Negotiations as a Two-Level Game: The Importance of Domestic Politics’, Diplomacy & Statecraft, 27
(2016) 545; Milena Sterio, ‘President Obama’s Legacy: The Iran Nuclear Agreement?’, Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law, 48 (2016) 69.
56 See The Abraham Accords Declaration (13 August 2020), www.state.gov/the-abraham-accords/ (United Arab Emirates, Israel
and United States); Declaration of Peace (15 September 2020) (Bahrain, Israel and United States)
57 Igor V Karaman, Dispute Resolution in the Law of the Sea 331-36 (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff 2012).
58 Jacob Bercovitch (ed.), Resolving International Conflicts: The Theory and Practice of Mediation (London: Lynne Rienner
1996); Marieke Kleiboer, The Multiple Realities of International Mediation (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner 1998); Melanie
C. Greenberg, John H. Barton & Margaret E. McGuinness (eds.), Words Over War: Mediation and Arbitration to Prevent Deadly
Conflict (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield 2000); Jacob Bercovitch & Scott Sigmund Gartner (eds.), International
Conflict Mediation: New Approaches and Findings (Routledge 2009); Francisco Orrego Vicuña, ‘Mediation’, VII Max Planck
Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press 2012), 46; Sven M.G. Koopmans,
Negotiating Peace: A Guide to the Practice, Politics, and Law of International Mediation (Oxford: Oxford University Press
2018); Tanaka, The Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes, 45-50.
59 Vinceç Fisas (ed.), 2014 Yearbook on Peace Processes 10 (2014).
54

9
the Security Council, by the General Assembly or by the Secretary-General’ and that states can
rely on the Secretary-General’s good offices ‘conducted independently of the deliberative
bodies’, which may prove to be more effective at times for resolving disputes.60 Thereafter,
within the DPA, a Policy and Mediation Division was created to serve as a central resource to
support mediation efforts, even on very short notice. Indeed, within that division a Mediation
Support Unit was established in 2007, which manages a standby team of senior mediation
advisers on a wide range of issues who ‘can be deployed anywhere in the world within 72 hours
to provide advice on mediation and conflict prevention efforts’.61
Various prominent incidents of mediation occurred in the post-Cold War period. For
example, former President of Finland Martti Ahtisaari served for several years as the UN
mediator between Serbia and the authorities in Kosovo prior to the latter’s declaration of
independence in 2008, service for which (along with other assignments) he was awarded the
2008 Nobel Peace Prize.62 Likewise, Matthew Nimetz served for years as a UN mediator of the
dispute between Greece and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, leading ultimately to
an agreement in 2018 that the latter would take the name ‘Republic of North Macedonia’.63 A
U.S. mediation between Israel and Lebanon led in 2022 to an agreement permanently
establishing their maritime boundary.64 To provide a framework for such mediation, various
international organizations in their subject areas developed specialized rules for mediation.65
Further, in this period there was also greater attention to the development of international
instruments that assist in the mediation of commercial relationships, notably the adoption of the
UN Convention on International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation (Singapore
Convention), which provides for the ability to enforce and invoke such agreements in resolution
of commercial disputes.66
Mediation also featured during the post-Cold war period in the practice of regional
organizations, such as the Organisation of American States (OAS).67 For example, the OAS was
active in mediating the border dispute between Belize and Guatemala,68 which resulted in three
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61 UN Department of Political Affairs, United Nations Conflict Prevention and Preventive Diplomacy in Action, 4; see UN
Peacemaker, Standby Team of Senior Mediation Advisers, peacemaker.un.org/mediation-support/stand-by-team.
62 See Katri Merikallio & Tapani Ruokanen, The Mediator: A Biography of Martti Ahtisaari (London: Hurst & Company 2015).
63 See Matthew Nimetz, ‘The Macedonian “Name” Dispute: The Macedonian Question—Resolved?’, Nationalities Papers, 48
(2020) 205.
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See, e.g., World Intellectual Property Organization, WIPO Mediation, Arbitration, Expedited Arbitration and Expert
Determination Rules and Clauses (2020), at www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_446_2020.pdf.
66 UN Convention on International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation, 20 December 2018, UN Doc
A/RES/73/198, annex; see Natalie Y. Morris-Sharma, ‘The Singapore Convention is Live, and Multilateralism, Alive!’, Cardozo
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 20 (2019) 1009.
67 See, e.g., César Gaviria, Secretary General, The OAS in Transition 1994-2004, 87 (2004) (dispute settlement chapter provides
an overview of OAS-led mediation of disputes in the Americas). In the African system, the Organisation of African United
established a Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration, but the African Union (AU) replaced the Commission with
the African Union Court of Justice. See Constitutive Act of the African Union, art. 18, July 11, 2000, 2158 UNTS 33.
68 For background, see OAS, ‘The Fund for Peace: Peaceful Settlement of Territorial Disputes: The Role of the OAS in
Mediating the Belize-Guatemala Territorial Dispute’ (undated),
www.oas.org/es/sap/dsdme/pubs/role_of_the_oas_belize_guatemala.pdf; see also Montserrat Gorina-Ysern, ‘OAS Mediates in
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agreements during 2000-5: an agreement on confidence-building measures along the border; a
2008 special agreement on submitting the dispute to the International Court of Justice after
national referenda; and ultimately submission of the dispute to the ICJ in 2019.69
The concept of ‘good offices’, which is not referred to in the UN Charter, is often
assimilated to that of mediation, but in principle might be seen as referring to a situation where
the third party simply provides a means for two disputing parties to meet, without the third party
taking an independent and substantive role in resolving the dispute.70 An informative example in
the post-Cold War period was the role played by certain officials of the government of Norway
with respect to meetings in the 1990s between representatives of Israel and the Palestine
Liberation Organisation. Such meetings occurred secretly in Norway without that government
taking a substantive role in the discussions, eventually leading to a negotiated process for
settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (the Oslo Accords). Of course, a process initially
conceived of as good offices may evolve over time into one of mediation or even arbitration, as
appears to have been the case for the 1999-2004 talks between the parties to the Cyprus problem.
There, the UN Secretary-General’s representative became substantively involved in the
negotiations and, later, the Secretary-General was given authority by the parties to fill in ‘gaps’
where the parties could not reach agreement.71
Finally, the method of ‘inquiry’ also featured in the post-Cold War period,72 to include
fact-finding by the United Nations,73 as well as by its specialized agencies.74 This method also
found traction in other international and regional organizations, and even in national settings in
relation to international law (notably alleged violations of human rights), prompting efforts to
develop guidelines for how such fact-finding bodies should operate.75 Notably, the inquiry
function developed by the Permanent Court of Arbitration can be used for disputes between
states, state entities, and international organizations, as well as private parties.76
V.

Conciliation of disputes

Belize-Guatemala Border Dispute’, ASIL Insights, 5 (2000), asil.org/insights/volume/5/issue/20/oas-mediates-belize-guatemalaborder-dispute.
69 Guatemala’s Territorial, Insular and Maritime Claim (Guatemala v. Belize), ICJ (pending).
70 See Ruth Lapidoth, ‘Good Offices’, in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford, New York: Oxford
University Press 2012), 528; Tanaka, The Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes, 43-45.
71 See Report of the Secretary-General on his Mission of Good Offices, UN doc. S/2004/437 (2004); see generally Thomas M.
Franck & Georg Nolte, ‘The Good Offices Function of the U.N. Secretary-General’ in Benedict Kingsbury & Adam Roberts
(eds.), United Nations, Divided World (New York: Oxford University Press1993), 143; Alys Brehio, Note, ‘Good Offices of the
Secretary-General as Preventive Measures’, NYU Journal of International Law & Policy, 30 (1998), 592.
72 Tanaka, The Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes, 63-64 (discussing inquiries into the 2010 Mavi Marmara incident
involving the delivery of aid to Gaza and into the 2014 downing of a Malaysian airline over the eastern part of Ukraine).
73 See, e.g., Declaration on Fact-finding by the United Nations in the Field of the Maintenance of International Peace and
Security, UNGA Res 46/59 (9 December 1991), annex; see generally, Mónica Pinto, ‘Inquiry Procedures: United Nations Human
Rights Bodies’, in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (2018), www.opil.ouplaw.com (subscription
database).
74 A notable example in this regard was the establishment in 1993 of the World Bank Inspection Panel. See Ibrahim F.I. Shihata,
The World Bank Inspection Panel: In Practice (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press 2000).
75 See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni & Christina Abraham (eds.), Siracusa Guidelines for International, Regional and National FactFinding Bodies (Cambridge, Antwerp, Portland: Intersentia 2013).
76 See ‘Fact-finding / Commissions of Inquiry’, Permanent Court of Arbitration (undated), www.pca-cpa.org/en/services/factfinding-commissions-of-inquiry/.
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In contrast with mediation, conciliation is a more formal method of dispute settlement,
typically involving a person or panel of persons charged with receiving formal submissions from
the disputing parties and then issuing a report containing recommendations for resolution of the
dispute. Unlike arbitration or judicial settlement, however, the report imposes no binding
decision upon the disputing parties, such that if it fails to bridge the gap between them, the
dispute likely continues.77 As discussed above, there has been a discernible and robust use of
negotiation and mediation in the period since the end of the Cold War; by contrast, the resort by
States to conciliation has been minimal, and certainly has not lived up to the development of
rules in this area.
Thus, several new multilateral agreements called for conciliation as a means of resolving
agreement-related disputes, such as the 1992 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC),78 or
the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change79 and its associated 2015 Paris
Agreement.80 Various issues are addressed in such agreements, including the method for
appointing the conciliator(s), whether the conciliator(s) are empowered to decide upon their own
competence, whether the process is confidential, and the form of the final outcome. An
interesting aspect of some of these contemporary rules is the possibility of ‘compulsory’
conciliation, whereby a state party to the relevant convention is bound to go through a
conciliation process, even if it is not bound by its outcome. Thus, under the LOSC, there are
certain automatic limitations to binding dispute settlement (article 297) and certain optional
exceptions that a state party may invoke when adhering to the Convention (article 298). Yet
where such limitations or exceptions apply, the state party nevertheless may be compelled to
accept conciliation in accordance with detailed procedures spelled out in the LOSC.81
Likewise, various institutions crafted rules in the post-Cold War period for how an interstate conciliation process might unfold for unspecified types of disputes, such as the Conference
on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE)’s 1992 Stockholm Convention,82 the United
Nations 1995 Model Rules for the Conciliation of Disputes between States,83 or the Permanent
Court of Arbitration’s 1996 Optional Conciliation Rules84—all developments that parallel those
that developed as well in the commercial sphere.85 The Stockholm Convention created a Court of
Conciliation and Arbitration, headquartered in Geneva, and provided for the typical form of
conciliation whereby it is initiated by the consent of the disputing parties. Yet the CSCE also
contemplated compulsory conciliation arising from a decision of the OSCE Ministerial Council
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or its Committee of Senior Officials, entailing a ‘consensus minus two’ formula. Such
compulsory conciliation, however, allowed states to opt out for certain types of disputes.86
Yet despite the adoption of new paths and rules for conciliation, the practice in this
period did not follow suit. For example, although 34 states have ratified the Stockholm
Convention as of 2021, no conciliations have yet to arise before the Court.87 A similar hesitation
to pursue conciliation may be seen in the context of investor-state and state-state disputes before
the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ISCID). Although starting in
the 1990s, there was a marked increase in the number of cases brought to ICSID for dispute
settlement,88 the percentage of conciliation cases each year or in the aggregate since 1966 has
never exceeded two percent.89
Even so, the potential for resort to such conciliation was demonstrated in 2016 when
Timor-Leste pursued compulsory conciliation against Australia under the LOSC, for the purpose
of settling their long-disputed maritime boundary in the Timor Sea and associated issues.
Although Australia challenged the conciliation commission’s competence on various grounds,
such challenges were rejected.90 Thereafter, the commission pursued a creative process of
meetings, sometimes with one party, sometimes with both parties, sometimes consisting of the
commission as a whole, and sometimes of just its president. Over time, the parties apparently
became comfortable with the process and saw the advantages of reaching an agreement in areas
that previously had alluded them.91 Based on these discussions, the parties in 2018 concluded a
Treaty on the Timor Sea Maritime Boundary which, among other things, established a sharing
ratio for the natural resources in certain promising continental shelf gas fields. The process led to
a final report and recommendations in 2018, which were made public, thus offering lessons
learned for similar resolution of other disputes.92
VI.

Mass claims programs

An important development in post-Cold War dispute settlement was the re-emergence of
venues (often arbitral or quasi-arbitral) for addressing mass claims, meaning an extremely large
number of claims that cannot efficiently be litigated in the traditional fashion, but instead are best
addressed through broad categories of claims subjected to relaxed evidentiary standards. While
mass claims programs were common from the end of the eighteenth century through World War
86
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Reinisch & Anthony Sinclair, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary (2nd edn., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2009)
(containing a chapter on conciliation at the ICSID).
90 See Compulsory Conciliation Commission on the Timor Sea (Timor-Leste v. Australia) (Decision on Competence) (2016)
Permanent Court of Arbitration.
91 See, e.g., Jianjun Gao, ‘The Timor Sea Conciliation (Timor-Leste v. Australia): A Note on the Commission’s Decision on
Competence’, Ocean Development & International Law, 49 (2018) 208; Dai Tamada, ‘The Timor Sea Conciliation: The Unique
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II, they declined in popularity in the post-war period because of notorious delays in processing
such claims.93 These delays and inefficiencies have been mitigated by significant technological
developments, once again making mass claims programs a practical dispute resolution option.94
Post-Cold War mass claims programs used various institutional frameworks: sometimes
pursuant to treaties between states; at other times pursuant to other arrangements, such as a
Security Council resolution; sometimes independent of national processes and yet at other times
with a close connection to such processes.95 Indeed, the impetus for such mass claims programs
was often in reaction to lawsuits brought before national courts, in some instances through
“strategic litigation.”96 Traditionally, only states could file claims on behalf of individuals in
international mass claims programs. Yet in the post-Cold War period, no doubt influenced by the
increasing centrality of the individual in the field of international law, individuals often were
granted direct standing to present their claims.97
As a general matter, mass claims programs allow a large number of persons to receive
compensation for similar claims more quickly than they would through traditional judicial
avenues.98 States or international organizations establishing mass claims programs have
considerable flexibility in creating the procedural rules of the program (flexibility not typically
available through judicial mechanisms).99 Indeed, the mass claims programs in the post-Cold
War era have had to consider a wide range of issues in constructing the program, such as: which
comparable types of claims could be grouped together; whether fixed amount compensation
should be used; what evidentiary standards would apply to the different groups of claims; what
computer programs were necessary for data-matching, statistical sampling, and regression
analysis; and so on. No single model existed; indeed, flexibility in relation to the underlying
circumstances was perhaps the attribute that the mass claims programs all had in common.
Examples included: the Commission for Real Property Claims of Displaced Persons and
Refugees in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which handled some 240,000 claims relating to 320,000
properties in less than nine years; the Housing and Property Claims Commission in Kosovo,
which processed some 30,000 claims, mostly from refugees and internally displaced persons; the
German Forced Labor Compensation Program, which focused on more than 400,000 claims by
former forced laborers and other victims of Nazi Germany; the International Commission on
See John R. Crook, ‘Thoughts on Mass Claims Processes’, ASIL Proceedings of the Annual Meeting, 99 (2005) 80-91, at 80.
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Mass Claims Processes (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2007); Hans Van Houtte, Bart Delmartino & Iasson Yi, Post-War
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York: Cambridge University Press 2008); Hans Das & Hans Van Houtte, Post-War Restoration of Property Rights Under
International Law, Vol. 2: Procedural Aspects (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press 2008); Roger P. Alford,
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Tribunals (Leiden, Boston: Brill 2012) 575; Lea Brilmayer, Chiara Giorgetti & Lorraine Charlton (eds.), International Claims
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Holocaust Era Insurance Claims, which processed outstanding Holocaust-era claims against
insurance companies; the Claims Resolution Tribunal for Dormant Accounts, which resolved
thousands of claims against Swiss banks held by Holocaust victims or their heirs; and the
Holocaust Victim Assets Program, which arose from claims against Swiss banks and other Swiss
entities that collaborated with the Nazi regime, and which compensated five categories of victims
or targets of Nazi persecution. While several of these mass claims programs commenced shortly
after the end of a post-Cold War armed conflict, others addressed historical grievances, such as
the above programs dealing with Holocaust-era claims.
Perhaps the most prominent of these mass-claims programs was the UN Compensation
Commission (UNCC). The UNCC was established as a subsidiary organ of the UN Security
Council in 1991 to process claims and pay compensation for losses resulting from Iraq’s 1990-1
invasion and occupation of Kuwait. Given the notoriety of Iraq’s conduct and the harm caused
by that conduct to numerous states and their nationals, the Council concluded that Iraq ‘is liable,
under international law, for any direct loss, damage, including environmental damage and the
depletion of natural resources, or injury to foreign Governments, nationals and corporations, as a
result of Iraq’s unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait’.100 In light of that finding, the
UNCC was charged with receiving and processing claims relating to death, injury, property loss,
commercial loss and environmental damage resulting from Iraq’s invasion and occupation. In
2005, the Commission concluded the processing of claims and, in 2007, it finished making
payments to individuals, having addressed 2,686,131 claims and awarded more than $52
billion.101
The first mass claims programs associated with an international criminal tribunal was
established with the creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC). The ICC Trust Fund for
Victims provided a reparations mechanism to victims of proven crimes within the ICC’s
jurisdiction.102 For example, in 2017, the ICC Trial Chamber II in the Katanga case awarded
individual and collective reparations to victims of crimes against humanity and war crimes in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, to be paid from or implemented through the Trust Fund.103
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